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Recently climate change has moved to the top of political agendas in many countries, with 
the prevailing political discourse advocating adaptation and mitigation of present and 
anticipated effects of climate change as they affect development of the nations (Mercer, 
2010). Labelled as perhaps the greatest global crisis humanity has ever faced and referred 
to as ‘climate breakdown’ (Monbiot, 2013), climate change is seen as a global long-term 
disaster (King, 2004), and a threat to both social and political stabilities (Abbott et al., 2007; 
Fussey and South, 2012).  
Climate change adaptation (CCA) in particular has been discussed as an integral part of 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) (Kelman et al., 2017) - and thus resilience, however security 
frames are becoming increasingly prominent for understanding, mitigating and adapting to 
its impacts. Major shifts in the political landscape during 2016 (e.g. Brexit, the US elections) 
have brought further and unexpected transformation to such imbrications of security and 
climate change. In particular, the rise of the ‘alt-right’, ‘post-truth’ politics have heightened 
the emphasis on protectionist and security-based responses to complex global problems. 
This has been most pronounced in Trump’s America, where security has become configured 
in a more parochial sense: a protectionist reflex that emphasises the integrity of national 
borders and restrictions on flows of labour, economy and variously imagined foreign 
menaces, and acquired a prominence not seen for decades. Simultaneously, and relatedly, 
the influence and very existence of seemingly abstract threats such climate change become 
relegated and denied (e.g. Hollander, 2017). As these processes continue to advance, 
understanding the role of security, and its evolving relationship with climate change, 
becomes more pressing and urgent.  
Drawing upon the UK context, this paper argues that the issue of climate change has 
become framed increasingly in terms of security, and seeks to identify a range of drivers that 
have shaped and modulated this process. In doing so, we identify both the existence of this 
series of broader securitising tendencies and their situation against a number of prominent 
understandings of this relationship. Some argue that securitisation of climate change will 
lead towards its militarisation and the use of traditional security instruments that invite 
security-focused responses at the expense of tackling the roots of climate change (von 
Lucke et al., 2014), while others believe that it is impossible to securitise climate change 
since it is framed through future scenarios and involves too many unknowns (Rasmussen, 
2006). As a corollary, questions become raised over the way climate related perturbations 
that are amenable to actionable responses, phenomena that can be understood and 
resolved within existing frames of policy and practice, become prioritised. There are also 
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arguments that the focus should be on mitigation and governance of climate change instead 
of solely treating it as a direct threat (Corry, 2012).  
The discussion around the securitisation of climate change is not new (e.g. Barnett, 2003; 
McDonald, 2013) but it has largely focused on the analysis of international policy. In the UK, 
securitisation of climate change has been discussed in the context of migration (Boas, 
2015), energy (Shin and Choi, 2015), and nature (Davoudi, 2014). This paper employs 
critical discourse analysis in order to understand the shifts in the role of climate change in 
the national policy and to explore its securitisation in the context of climate change risks at a 
national level.  
The process of securitisation 
  
Securitisation is defined as a successful speech act, ‘through which an intersubjective 
understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures 
to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 491), a perspective that informs our 
approach. While often reduced to ideas around a growing dominance of security discourse, 
careful attention to the conceptual origins of securitisation theory adds particularly valuable 
elements to our understanding of shifting approaches to climate change. As a starting point 
(Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998), securitisation is principally concerned with the way a 
range of politicised processes configure subjects as problems of security (or as something in 
need of securitising).  
The key – and often underplayed – element of this theory is the role of intersubjectivity, a 
concept that promotes a series of other issues to analytical prominence, including those 
concerning security governance and security discourse. Intersubjectivity constitutes an 
important site of analysis given that it accommodates points of fractional coherence in the 
ways threats are framed by different actors. This attends to neither ‘objective’ consensual 
understandings of threats, nor subjective perspectives on them, but a more relational yet 
accepted perspective of threats. Thus, whilst there may be a shared understanding that a 
threat exists, the meanings attributed to it may vary (hence ‘intersubjectivity’). As theorised 
in this sense, securitisation theory comprises a further, communicative, element: ‘a 
sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what 
it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development (oral threat or event) is 
threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it’ (Balzacq, 2005, p.173, 
emphasis in original).  
A key theme of these original formulations of securitisation theory, then, is the emphasis 
given to different institutional domains, subject to varying vulnerabilities, threats, survival 
strategies and organisational responses. Crucially, proponents of securitisation theory seek 
to identify how such processes are seen to identify threats to an increasing range of objects 
and domains in need of securitising.  
Numerous criticisms of securitisation theory have gained prominence in recent years. 
Many of these relate to the way securitisation activities are reduced to fixed and 
immutable mechanisms (Balzacq, 2005), or a supposed linearity where securitisation 
processes are seen be part of ambitions for total security (Fussey and Coaffee, 2012). 
Perhaps most prescient are criticisms that interrogate crucial differences between threats 
and risks and their relationship to such theoretical formulations. Here, the precipitous 
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growth of ‘risk’ in all its manifestations - as a technique for ‘taming’ the future, technology 
of governance and as a behemoth for critical analyses – creates particular problems for 
the explanatory potential of securitisation theory. Threats pose a challenge to existential 
endurance and therefore focus responses to modes of survival (Huysmans, 1998). Risks 
do not. This observation has led numerous critics to question the continued relevance of 
securitisation theory given the far greater attention afforded to issues of risk, rather than 
threat, over the last 20 years. 
Owing to the nature of emerging threats, security is increasingly thought of in terms of a risk 
of a threat (rather than a threat itself): a threat is an identified danger that can be stopped, 
whereas risk is a future possibility, and therefore a policy is needed to control or mitigate it. 
Risks that do not materialise still remain potential risks (Corry, 2012). Consequently, this 
shift towards the logic of risk elevates the emphasis on vulnerability, and raises important 
questions over attendant policy practices.  
Provision of security is traditionally seen as the core responsibility of a nation-state that 
manages external and internal threats to national security within a geographically defined 
territory. However, such definition has recently been challenged by the inclusion of non-
military threats that have a non-state nature (international terrorism, pandemics) into the 
security agendas of nation-states (Fjader, 2014). The UK’s National Security Strategy (NSS) 
states that the risks of global threats are more prominent as ‘we are one of the most open 
societies, in a world that is more networked than ever before’ (HMG, 2010, p. 3) and refers 
to a myriad of new threats, including climate change. Many of these emerging risks are 
anthropogenic in nature, so modern society ‘has increasingly become a risk society in a 
sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it 
itself has produced’ (Beck, 2008, p.1).   
Securitisation of climate change risks 
Security policy is often seen as synonymous with the thematics of national security 
(McDonald, 2013). However, in the context of climate change, the concept of human and 
livelihood security attains additional relevance: security responses to climate change risks 
include adaptation to natural hazards and increasing resilience (Schafer et al., 2016). 
Climate change has become part of an international security discussion since the mid-
2000s; it was first mentioned in 2007 in the first Security Council debate on climate change 
security, followed in 2009 by the first General Assembly debate on climate change security, 
and a second debate in 2011, followed by informal remarks in 2013 (Boas, 2015; Scott, 
2012). Boas and Rothe (2016) argue that the relationship of climate change and security 
should be analysed through the lens of environmental and human security, risks and threats 
as well as national and international conflicts, and that climate security should be discussed 
in terms of complexity, preparedness, decentralisation and empowerment. Climate change is 
now seen as a security risk because it can impede development of a nation (Floyd, 2008). It 
is also important to remember that ‘the threat to our climate security comes not from outside 
but from within: we are all our own enemies’ (Beckett, 2007, p. 56). 
The risk of climate change is largely future-oriented as the impacts are uncertain. However, 
the evidence of the increase in frequency and intensity of climate change impacts is 
becoming more apparent when looking at the recent climate-related natural hazards (IPCC, 
2014). Climate change does not fit neatly into the traditional security discourse as it lacks 
‘friend-enemy’ logic (Boas and Rothe, 2016). Instead, climate risks are seen as a part of 
resilience agenda, which is in turn a part of a security agenda (Coaffee and Fussey, 2015; 
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Chmutina et al., 2016). The word ‘security’ makes a risk more noticeable in the eyes of 
government, thus ensuring that the risk is suitably prominent in government agendas (de 
Wilde, 2008). This specific prominence and rendering of risk to government bodies thus 
allows them to become actionable and governable through the tools, assets and frames 
available to these same institutions. Risks are authored in the image of their discoverers.  
This trend is clear in the UK: whilst the original intention of the UK climate change policy 
framework was focused on mitigation, it has gradually expanded towards adaptation; with 
CCA eventually becoming a prominent part of security policy frameworks (Figure 1). Such 
shift has largely been triggered by a number of severe weather events (floods in 1998 and 
2007; 2013 Heatwave; 2014 and 2015 Winter storms), encouraging not only some 
improvements in emergency management, but also in preparedness (i.e. CCA). The UK 
NSS states: ‘The physical effects of climate change are likely to become increasingly 
significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the world’ (HMG, 
2010, p.17). The National Risk Register (NRR) describes climate change as ‘not only a 
future challenge’, as the results of it are already apparent in the UK (Cabinet Office, 2017, 
p.8). Despite the high level of political attention to this issue, there have been considerable 
variants to how CCA has been translated into practice. Seeing climate change as a ‘risk 
multiplier’ means that existing ways of dealing with things are deemed sufficient. Rather than 
undertaking difficult and expensive transformative action, all that is required is an 
intensification of current approaches. 
 
Figure 1 Securitisation of climate change in the UK (adapted from Corry, 2012) 
The UK is often seen as the first country to discuss climate change as a security issue in 
policy, and was one of the first countries to introduce a Climate and Energy Security Envoy 
(in 2009) and departments dedicated to climate change-related security issues (Boas and 
Rother, 2016). The UK has played an important role in promoting the securitisation of 
climate change internationally, particularly during its 2007 Presidency of the UN’s Security 
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Council, when the UK called the first ever meeting on the impacts of climate change. 
Expressing a now-common refrain, the chair of the session Margaret Beckett MP stated that 
climate change had become a collective security issue as we now live in an inter-dependent 
world (Brito, 2009) and listed border disputes, migration, energy supplies and other resource 
shortages, societal stresses and humanitarian crises as the issues closely associated with 
climate change (UK Missions to the UN, 2007). Embracing a new understanding of national 
security, the UK government has adopted a risk-based ‘all hazards’ and ‘all of society’ 
approach (Fjader, 2014). Securitisation of climate change was also driven by security of 
water, food and energy supply, which are seen as catalysis of human and national security 
as availability of these resource affects states and citizens (Schefer et al., 2016). 
Such developments raise important questions over the reach, scope and focus of 
securitisation processes as they apply to climate change. Moreover, how these processes 
are driven, mediated and modulated reveal how selective articulations of risk (and preferred 
mechanisms for its amelioration) attain prominence.  
Methodology 
This paper extends the application of a constructivist approach by exploring how various 
events and discourses shape the securitisation of climate change risks. The analysis is 
empirically informed by companioning discourse analysis (Hajer, 1995) with focus group 
methodologies to explore how discursive realities are constructed within the discourse of 
climate change, risks and security. Sources of data included key UK policy documents and 
parliamentary debates, and a large multi-staged focus group.  
More specifically, we develop an approach drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis methods 
(as proposed by Fairclough 1992 and is used by, for instance, Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011, 
p.135); it emphasises the political processes that create meaning by enabling ‘the 
examination of language as integral in the creation of discursive reality’. Such an approach 
allows identifying how a certain discourse becomes hegemonic by making its beliefs 
‘normalised’. This method was applied through the analysis of three elements: text, 




Figure 2 Research framework (based on Fairclough, 1992) 
The first element – Social practice – in the larger social, political and historical context within 
which the Discursive practice operates. Such a framework allows exploring the discourse in 
which the meanings embedded in the text come to exist within wider social context. The 
second element – Discursive practice – helps establish the context within which the Text 
exists and to understand where the evidence for the securitisation of climate change risks 
can be found. The third element – Text – demonstrates how the securitisation of climate 
change is discussed in the written and oral form (Fairclough, 1992). All steps have been 
interrogated through the analysis of existing academic literature, 70 policy and parliamentary 
documents (Appendix 1), and notes captured during an eight-hour multi-stage focus group 
organised by the authors.  
Focus group methodology (inter alia Bryman 2012) was drawn upon to access both 
individual and organisational understandings, framing and operationalisation of climate 
change through narratives of security. 23 distinguished security experts and senior 
policymakers (Appendix 2) took part in a focus group in January 2015. Its aim was not to 
discuss climate change as a security issue; instead, this theme was introduced by the 
participants as an important part of the UK security agenda. During the discussion, the 
participants were divided into four groups facilitated by the authors, and were asked to 
complete three stages of analytical discussion: 1) To answer the question ‘What has 
influenced security?’; 2) To describe the main dimensions of security; and 3) To reflect upon 
the authors’ understanding of security based on the analysis of the policy documents. Focus 
group methodology facilitated access to how participants constructed and interpreted the 
role of climate change and securitisation via their own subjective and operational language 
7 
 
and positioning. It also allowed the authors to capture a range of shared narratives, 
alongside features of organisational cultures, as participants built on the insights of peers 
from common communities of practice (Bryman, 2012). 
Data analysis 
An interpretive framework, allowing to “focus on meanings that shape actions and 
institutions, and the ways in which they do it” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2004, p.130), was used to 
analyse the meaning of policy - and how this meaning is implemented. Policy analysis 
contextualised the language and representations made in policy documents in the UK within 
expanded bodies of knowledge. Only the official government/parliament documents* 
explicitly referring to ‘climate change’, climate-induced hazards and ‘security’ in the same 
context have been analysed for this paper. Over 400 results were identified, and 70 policy 
documents relevant to criteria above were analysed.  
A more nuanced understanding of securitisation of climate change was achieved through the 
thematic analysis of transcripts of the focus group discussion. An inductive approach was 
taken, with initial higher level coding based on the key discussion themes such as drivers of 
security agenda and roles in security. Further lower level coding was developed and refined 
as data analysis progressed, including the analysis of specific events and examples of the 
actions taken. Thematic analysis was chosen due to the complexity of the dataset and the 
need for a flexible analytical process to provide structure to the findings (Howitt and Cramer, 
2011) and allowed identification of a variety of approaches to securitisation.  
 
Exploring securitisation of climate change in the UK 
Social practice: The context of climate change risks securitisation  
In order to understand the securitisation of climate change risks, it is important to assess the 
key elements and drivers shaping how this securitisation process developed in the UK. The 
lens of power – and the role of climate change in political agenda – helps understanding the 
shifts in how climate change risks are addressed and the associated distribution of 
governmental responsibility. Neoliberalism primarily sees climate change as an economic 
issue (Oels, 2006), and is thus considered through energy supply and demand, market 
efficiency etc. (Lovell et al., 2009). More recently however a new story line – securitisation - 
has appeared, offering an actionable and ‘practical’ solution to a problem. In 2004, Sir David 
King (the then UK’s government chief scientific adviser) stated that ‘climate change in the 
most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious even that the threat of 
terrorism’, as it affects millions of people globally. This was echoed by John Aston (2006) 
who emphasised that ‘we need to treat climate change not as a long-term threat to our 
environment but as an immediate threat to our security and prosperity’. The UK government 
recognises that security and prosperity are closely entwined, and it is for this reason that the 
security implications of just climate change need to be taken seriously. For example, the 
greatest threat identified from the 2007 UK floods was the risk that the economic damage 
caused would impact upon the UK’s economic status which, in turn, would undermine 
confidence in the UK government and create societal tensions (Pitt, 2008). The NRR 2017 
states that the risk of high temperatures will have an impact on ‘health, well-being and 
productivity’ (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.8, emphasis added). Climate change has also been 
                                                 
* I.e. the documents available at the gov.uk and parliament.uk 
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acknowledged by government departments, which traditionally would not have been 
concerned with such issues. For instance, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) has published (and 
later updated) a detailed Sustainable Development strategy, in which climate change is 
noted as playing an important role (MOD, 2011). 
Closely related to the climate change agenda is the risk from natural hazards: projected 
changes in the climate include temperature increases on land and at sea, sea-level rise, 
melting of glaciers and ice caps, and changing and irregular rainfall patterns (IPCC, 2014). 
This points towards consideration, and potential conflation, of climate change as a security 
issue. The evidence and consequences of such risks are highlighted in the NRR: “As well as 
a trend towards warmer winters and hotter summers, sea levels around the UK’s coast are 
rising by around 3mm a year and there is evidence of changing rainfall patterns. Heavy 
rainfall and flooding, such as the UK saw over the winter of 2015/16, illustrate the costs and 
disruption that can be caused by extreme weather” (Cabinet Office, 2017, p.8).  
Discursive practice of climate change risks securitisation 
Discursive practice focuses on arguments that evidence securitisation of climate change 
risks in policies and government and parliament documents. In the UK policy climate change 
is presented from two perspectives: as a challenge that needs mitigating, and as a challenge 
that poses risks and therefore needs to be adapted to. When the UK Climate Change 
Programme was first initiated during 1994, its focus was largely on climate change 
mitigation, aiming to return carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, and further reduce the 
emissions by 80% by 2010. It became apparent in 2006 that the 2010 target would not be 
met, and as a consequence the 2008 Climate Change Act changed the targets to 80% 
reduction by 2050. CCA then started to receive more attention, leading to the creation of the 
Climate Change Risk Assessment, and establishment of the National Adaptation 
Programme. Of particular interest here is the way that climate change, and its associated 
strategies for adaptive amelioration, is approached in highly specific ways. Selective 
features of climate change – its ‘actionable elements’, manifestations that are visible and 
amenable to intervention rather than more ambiguous, long-term and unmanageable 
aspects – are foregrounded. The main focus of the National Adaptation Programme is on 
flooding (HMG, 2013), however the UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017 Evidence 
Report also adds high temperatures, water shortage, risks to ecosystems, food security, and 
pests and diseases as its top six areas of climate change risks. Other climate-related risks 
discussed in the report include exposure of interdependent infrastructure networks to 
multiple hazards; air quality; risks to culturally valued buildings; and international human 
displacement (CCC, 2016). Climate change itself does not feature in the national risk 
matrices as it is seen as a part of ‘longer-term vulnerabilities or broader issues that have the 
potential to negatively impact on society, but which are not confined to single events’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2015, p.27); however, the latest NRR points out that ‘long-term trends (such 
as climate change) increase the chance or severity of civil emergencies’ (Cabinet Office, 
2017, p.69). Such practices further demonstrate the ways in which risks and responsibilities 
associated with climate change are subjected to politicised definitional processes.The UK 
Climate Change Risk Assessment explains why climate change is not seen as a risk: it is 
assessed differently because the climate change risk assessment focuses on long-term risks 
(up to the year 2100) that can aid long-term and short-term decisions on adaptation policy, 
whereas the National Risk Assessment focuses on most significant specific threats and 
hazards over a five year period, i.e. those that could threaten national security interests, and 
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drives contingency planning for responding to and recovering from these threats and 
hazards (HMG, 2012).  
Whilst the links between climate change and some natural hazards are obvious, they are 
only occasionally discussed together in policy documents (Table 1). This can be explained 
by the fact that natural hazards are often covered by the DRR and resilience agendas that 
tend to be over-influenced by reactive, emergency response/ preparedness practices; 
agendas that are responsibilities of different departments that do not sufficiently overlap with 
policies aimed at CCA (Chmutina et al., 2017). Such partial coherences, drawn towards the 
poles of emergency planning and security, further express the degrees of intersubjectivity 
that permeate the securitisation of climate change risks.  
Notable here is how the securitisation of climate change is a recent development, and was 
not mentioned by the National Security Strategies until 2008. Climate change is often 
described to be a factor that will increase the intensity of the natural hazards in the future, a 
‘risk multiplier’:† “Building resilience will therefore need to consider the impacts of climate 
change over the lifetime of the infrastructure and make allowances for the magnitude of 
future hazards in investment decisions to secure the necessary adaptation over time” 
(Cabinet Office, 2013, p.28). A number of political leaders and academics have stated that 
climate change is now becoming an issue of national security (Helm, 2014; Harris, 2012). 
However, the NSS (although explicitly mentioning climate change) does not describe it as a 
risk. Climate change is also prominently mentioned in the NSS Review (HMG, 2015) and is 
treated as a global issue, and natural hazards (including climate-induces) are the highest 
priority (Tier 1) risk, due to the high impact and disruption such events can cause (HMG, 
2010). 
Table 1 Content analysis of successive government responses to climate change 2000-2015 demonstrates that 
only few documents cover both natural hazards and climate change 
Year Natural hazards Climate change 
2000  Climate Change Programme  
2004 Civil Contingencies Act  
2005                                             Making space for water 
2006  Climate Change Programme (revised) 
2008 Planning Act Climate Change Act 
2009 The Flood Risk Regulations MOD Climate change strategy  
 
2010 
Flood and Water Management Act  
Strategic framework on improving the 
resilience of critical infrastructure to 
disruptions from natural hazards 
 
2011 Natural Hazards and Infrastructure: Keeping the country running 
                                                 
† This development could also be considered as a scalar multiplier however maintaining fidelity to governmental 
lexicon forms the basis of our analysis.  
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2012  The UK climate change risk assessment  
2013 National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies 
Adapting to Climate Change 
Improving UK’s ability to absorb, respond 
to and recover from emergencies 
 
Reducing the threats of flooding and 
coastal change 
 
The national adaptation programme: making the country resilient to a changing climate 
2014 The national flood emergency framework 
for England 
 
2015 National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies 
 
2017 National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies‡ 
 
The Climate Change Risk Assessment states that it “has mainly examined the risks of a 
changing climate in the UK – not to the UK from abroad” (HMG, 2012, p.9). The 2011 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy gives little attention to the mechanisms for dealing with 
the suggested security threat of climate change either (DFID, 2011). It is only the Foresight 
report ‘International Dimensions of Climate Change’ (2011) that explicitly discusses the 
implications of global climate change for the UK security, including more calls for 
international humanitarian assistance and contingency arrangements; UK domestic protests 
increase as a result of more severe and widespread impacts from climate change impacts 
overseas; future defense planning fails to incorporate the full impacts of climate change. 
This however has not been reflected in the national policy to date. Whilst climate change 
attracts securitised framings and responses, it is absent in official security doctrine. This 
makes its securitising features subtler. 
Through the discursive practices the case is made for the securitisation of climate change.  
Although climate change is not treated as a risk itself, the severity of risks exacerbated by 
climate change dominates the political debates.  
 
Text: interrogating the securitisation of climate change risks  
The analysed texts demonstrated a number of ‘influencers’ that have effectively enabled the 
securitisation of climate change. Drawing upon the focus groups discussions it was possible 
to identify the most prominent themes with relation to climate change and security in the UK. 
The focus group participants produced a timeline (Figure 3) of the main events and 
background events that shaped the UK’s security discourses since the 1990s. In total, the 23 
delegates posted 116 separate ‘influences’§, each of which was deemed to have determined 
                                                 
‡ Here it is important to note the shift from natural hazards focus to a link between natural hazards and climate 
change, which can lead to an increase in severity of civil emergencies as already discussed in this section.    
§ The focus group participants were not explicitly asked to focus on climate change or climate change-related 
events; instead they were asked to write down ‘What has influenced security’ and place it on a timeline.  
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or shaped security discourses, with a particular focus upon ‘influences’ occurring during the 
last 10 years.  
 
Figure 3 Summary of selective 'security influencers' that are relevant to climate change discussion identified by 
the focus group participants 
The participants acknowledged climate change as a prominent process, however it was 
noted that it was specific climate-induced events (i.e. floods and storms) that trigger a 
change in security policy - and not explicitly the long-term process of climate change. It was 
also felt that climate change could become even more prominent in security discourses due 
to the likely impacts on global and regional inequalities and any subsequent knock-on 
consequences (population migration, civil unrest resulting from crop failures). 
The results of the focus group validated our findings: similarly to policy documents climate-
related events that have national – economic - impact are seen as a key driver of climate 
change securitisation. When discussing risks imposed by climate change, extreme weather 
events (non-specific) are seen as the largest risk posed by climate change to the UK 
security, mainly because such events can affect prosperity. 
Based on the analysis of the focus groups and policy documents, it appears that 
securitisation of climate change risk is made up of three elements; they structure the 
dominant discourse around climate change in the UK policy and debate: 
- Natural hazards (in particular flooding);   
- Conflict over and supply of resources (energy, food and water);   
- Economic damage. 
These elements have an immediate impact on the UK and its society, thus on a national 
level such trend focuses on adaptation – i.e. preparedness to the impacts of climate-induced 
hazards; and whilst it is understood that a more prominent political action on a global level is 
required in order to mitigate the root causes (GHG emissions), such understanding does not 
form a part of the security agenda.  
What is being securitised? 
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Fjader (2014) argues that ‘security as a strategy aims to stop the threat before it materialises 
or escalates, or […] to defeat it as soon as possible’ (p.123). This is however clearly not the 
case with the securitisation of climate change. Whilst the risks posed by climate change are 
high on the political agenda, the climate change mitigation efforts (that would address the 
actual causes of the risk) are gradually being abandoned: under the general banner of 
austerity cuts to renewable energy subsidies or energy efficiency schemes have become 
common. The Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC**) played a major role in 
addressing the mitigation of climate change; however it did so in silo. Furthermore, although 
the UK is still presenting itself as a leader in fighting climate change (as was emphasised 
during the COP21), the gap between the policy targets and the policy implementation is 
growing (Gillard, 2016). Thus, and despite rhetorical claims to the contrary, climate change 
at large has been gradually relegated from the government’s agenda. The discourse will now 
inevitably shift towards the specific climate-induced hazards, which are having an immediate 
impact in the UK, rather than on the long-term overall effects of climate change, which are 
uncertain (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 Simplified representation of variations to climate change discourses and the securitisation process 
Securitisation of climate change has gradually been ‘locked’ into a particular path of 
development – risks of natural hazards; thus the actual cause of the problem – 
anthropogenic GHG emissions – has been largely ignored in the security discourse and, 
similar to the framing of risks in terms of economic impacts outlined above, remains yoked to 
free market economic modes of production and neoliberal discourses more broadly. Most of 
                                                 
** DECC became part of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy in July 2016. 
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the climate change security strategies therefore focus on increasing the coping capacity of 
individuals and the nation rather than on long-term preventative strategies that can help 
climate change mitigation. Responses narrowly framed through the lens of securitisation 
attend most heavily to the consequences rather than the causes of climate change. 
The UK is not prepared for the impacts of climate change: whilst its contributions to 
mitigation efforts are critical, the impacts of climate change can already been seen today, 
and therefore it is clear that there is a need for more substantive mitigation strategies (CCC, 
2016). Such an approach leads to the following argument: climate change risks play out as 
both separate and intertwined agendas when human-induced activities can compound 
natural processes, and at the same time they are increasingly conflated within the policy 
discourse. This argument is not new: Beck (2008) argues that risks are increasingly 
becoming anthropogenic, with the boundaries between human-induced threats and natural 
hazards being eroded. 
The erosion of such boundaries is evident from the UK policy. Climate change is seen 
through two lenses simultaneously: as a security risk, and as a risk to security. The former 
means that climate change and its impacts will have an effect on wellbeing and prosperity; 
the latter focuses on the disruptive impacts of climate change (e.g. flooded electricity 
stations). The UK policy and discussions around climate change security mainly focus on the 
prosperity of the UK (i.e. securitisation takes place in order to protect economic development 
and economic prosperity of the country). Climate change is securitised because of the 
economic implications of its impacts and the uncertainties that come with climate change.  
The risk to security is thus seen through a prism of a specific hazard, which creates issues 
as climate change increases the frequency and intensity of a hazard. There is also a 
temporality issue: climate change is perceived as a distant problem with uncertain (but 
potentially catastrophic) impacts. Therefore the short-term horizon of a specific hazard is 
much easier to deal with after a disastrous event. Whilst the long-term thinking is critical for 
the risks associated with climate change, singling out a more specific risk with a more 
prominent impact (e.g. flooding) makes the task seem manageable.  
Episodic perturbations, such as seasonal flooding, bring dynamic temporalities, shifting 
governmental relations and additional security framings to the process. This in turn reveals a 
paradoxical process at the heart of state’s approaches to climate change, and highlights an 
additionally nuanced and complex articulation of neoliberalism (Chmutina et al., 2016). On 
the one hand, and principally during the time ahead of shock, responses to climate change 
have mobilised a centrifugal direction of governance, making non-state actors, localities and 
individuals responsible for their own vulnerabilities. Yet once large-scale climate-induced 
events occur, the state exercises its dominance via its co-ordination of command, control 
and response alongside deployments of military hardwares and other state assets. Such 
centripetal post-event practices also serve to bring the security-focused response to climate 
change into sharp relief. 
Conclusions 
There is evidence to suggest that climate change has been ‘securitised’, in a sense that 
there has been a (re)framing of climate change from an environmental/developmental 
perspective to a security perspective. However, a subsequent change in practice, 
programming and funding has not yet occurred. The inclusion of climate change and natural 
hazards into the NSS is a recent development and outlines a range of climate security-
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related ‘threats’ (Harris, 2012). But the increase in climate risks is not natural by origin; 
instead it is a result of the increased vulnerabilities of a changing society, due to complex 
processes including urbanisation, economic development and globalisation (Bosher and 
Chmutina, 2017). However shifting governmental relations and ownership of risk identified 
above generates ambiguity over where the sites of responsibility for mitigating and adapting 
to climate change lie.   
Since climate change has been securitised and closely tied with natural hazards, there 
should be more encouragement for the incorporation of CCA and DRR. Currently, whilst 
included in the security agenda, these two areas are perceived as separate, thus neglecting 
and underestimating their commonalities and goals, or being unable to overcome political 
constrains (Chmutina et al., 2017). Furthermore, decisions over significant investment in 
infrastructure may provide protection in the ‘here and now’ at enormous costs for future 
generations  
Climate change risks are uncertain and cannot be fully eradicated; instead they can only be 
managed. Climate change has become an item in the security agenda, under which a 
number of other issues are discussed, in particular natural hazards, and food and energy 
supply; it will thus remain present in the political discourse. However, its current prominence 
may diminish over time – as it is currently happening with climate change mitigation – 
depending on political attitudes to climate change of the leading party. The government 
mentality therefore needs to be changed and to become more holistic and long-term in order 
to address the temporality and uncertainly of such risks. Mobilising one-off actions will not 
defeat the risk of climate change and other risks related to it. It is important to recognise that 
the long-term risks of climate change that the UK (and most other nations) is currently facing 
might be a question of survival for other nations.  
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National Risk Register of Civil Contingencies  
Cabinet 
Office 
Guide 2013 Improving UK’s ability to absorb, respond to and 
recover from emergencies 
Cabinet 
Office 




Statement 2010 Strategic framework on improving the resilience 




Act 2004 Civil Contingencies Act 
DECC Policy  2016 DECC departmental plan 2015-2020 
DECC Statement to 
Parliament 
2015 Priorities for UK energy and climate change 
policy 
DECC Speech 2015 Secretary of State speech on Climate Change 
DECC Speech 2014 Address to the Green Growth Summit 
DECC Policy paper 2014 Annual energy statement 
DECC Policy paper 2014 Community energy strategy 
DECC Speech 2014 Green social change: building an Energy Saving 
Society 
DECC Statement to 
Parliament 
2014 Informal Energy and Environment Council 
DECC Policy paper 2014 Memorandum to the Energy and Climate Change 
Committee: Post Legislative Scrutiny of the 
Energy Act 2008  
DECC Policy paper 2014 Paris 2015: Securing our prosperity through a 
global climate change agreement 
DECC Speech 2014 Publication of Paris 2015: Securing our 
prosperity through a Global Climate Change 
Agreement 
DECC Policy paper 2013 2010 to 2015 government policy: UK energy 
security 
DECC Policy paper 2013 Annual energy statement 
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DECC Policy paper 2013 Going for Green Growth: The case for ambitious 
and immediate EU low carbon action 
DECC Policy  2013 Preparing for and responding to energy 
emergencies 
DECC Speech 2013 Securing Britain’s Energy Future 
DECC Speech 2013 The energy security challenge 
DECC Policy paper 2012 Annual energy statement 
DECC Speech 2012 Climate & Resource Security Dialogue for the 
21st Century conference 
DECC Speech 2012 Edward Davey speech to Climate & Resource 
Security Dialogue for the 21st Century 
conference 
DECC Policy paper 2012 Electricity market reform: policy overview  
DECC Policy paper 2012 Government Response to the House of 
Commons Energy and Climate Change Select 
Committee Report into the draft Energy Bill 
DECC Speech 2011 Climate Impacts Study 
DECC Enquiry 2010 Electricity market report  
DECC Speech 2010 Sustainable energy security 
DECC Webpage   About us 
DECC Policy page   Climate change and energy security  
DEFRA Report 2012, 
2017 
The climate change risk assessment 
DEFRA Policy 2000, 
2006 
Climate change programme 
DEFRA Policy 2013 Reducing the threats of flooding and coastal 
change 
DEFRA Framework 2013 The national flood emergency framework for 
England 
DEFRA Report 2012 Adapting to climate change 
DEFRA Strategy 2005 Making space for water 
DEFRA Policy paper 2015 2010 to 2015 government policy: climate change 
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2015 Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 
DFID Speech 2014 Forests and climate change in the post-2015 
agenda 
DFID Speech 2014 Taking action in response to the IPCC report on 
climate impacts, adaptation and vulnerability 
DFID Policy paper 2013 2010 to 2015 government policy: climate change 
impact in developing countries 
DFID Speech 2012 Coping with climate change and natural disasters 
DFID Speech 2012 Forests – tackling illegal logging and climate 
change 
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DFID Speech 2010 Climate Change 
FCO Speech 2015 Foreign Secretary’s Clean Energy Future speech 
FCO Speech 2014 Climate Change: Politics, Economics and 
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FCO Speech 2014 Foreign Secretary speech on climate change 
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